2 protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
3 Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@o2w.nl>,
4 2000-2002 Guus Sliepen <guus@sliepen.eu.org>
6 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
11 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 GNU General Public License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
20 $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.19 2003/01/17 00:37:20 guus Exp $
36 #include <openssl/sha.h>
37 #include <openssl/rand.h>
38 #include <openssl/evp.h>
40 #ifndef HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
41 #define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
49 #include "connection.h"
56 int send_id(connection_t *c)
60 return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
61 myself->connection->protocol_version);
64 int id_h(connection_t *c)
66 char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
71 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
72 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name,
77 /* Check if identity is a valid name */
80 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name,
81 c->hostname, "invalid name");
85 /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
88 if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
89 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name,
94 c->name = xstrdup(name);
96 /* Check if version matches */
98 if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
99 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
100 c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
104 if(bypass_security) {
106 init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
107 c->allow_request = ACK;
111 if(!c->config_tree) {
112 init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
114 bla = read_connection_config(c);
117 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname,
123 if(read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
127 /* Check some options */
129 if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
130 c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
132 if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
133 c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
135 c->allow_request = METAKEY;
137 return send_metakey(c);
140 int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
142 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
147 len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
149 /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
152 c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
155 c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
157 /* Copy random data to the buffer */
159 RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
161 /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
162 By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
164 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
166 Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
167 This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
168 This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
171 c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
173 if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
174 bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
175 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
176 syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
180 /* Encrypt the random data
182 We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
183 This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
184 with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
187 if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
188 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
189 c->name, c->hostname);
193 /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
195 bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
196 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
198 /* Send the meta key */
200 x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
201 c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
202 c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
203 c->outcompression, buffer);
205 /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
208 EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
209 c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
210 c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
211 c->outcipher->iv_len);
213 c->status.encryptout = 1;
219 int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
221 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
222 int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
227 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
228 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
233 len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
235 /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
237 if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
238 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
242 /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
245 c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
248 c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
250 /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
252 hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
254 /* Decrypt the meta key */
256 if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
257 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
258 c->name, c->hostname);
262 if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
263 bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
264 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
265 syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
268 /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
270 /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
273 c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
276 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
280 EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
281 c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
282 c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
283 c->incipher->iv_len);
285 c->status.decryptin = 1;
290 c->inmaclength = maclength;
293 c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
296 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
300 if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
301 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
308 c->incompression = compression;
310 c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
312 return send_challenge(c);
315 int send_challenge(connection_t *c)
317 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
322 /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
324 len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
326 /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
329 c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
331 /* Copy random data to the buffer */
333 RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
337 bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
338 buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
340 /* Send the challenge */
342 x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
347 int challenge_h(connection_t *c)
349 char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
354 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
355 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name,
360 len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
362 /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
364 if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
365 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
366 c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
370 /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
373 c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
375 /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
377 hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
379 c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
381 /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
383 return send_chal_reply(c);
386 int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
388 char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
393 /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
395 EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
396 EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge,
397 RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
398 EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
400 /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
402 bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
403 hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
407 return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
410 int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
412 char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
413 char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
418 if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
419 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
424 /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
426 if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
427 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
428 c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
432 /* Convert the hash to binary format */
434 hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
436 /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
438 EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
439 EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
440 EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
442 /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
444 if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
445 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
446 c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
448 if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
449 bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
450 hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
451 syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
457 /* Identity has now been positively verified.
458 Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
461 c->allow_request = ACK;
466 int send_ack(connection_t *c)
468 /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
469 to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
476 /* Estimate weight */
478 gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
479 c->estimated_weight =
480 (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec -
481 c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
482 x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight,
488 void send_everything(connection_t *c)
490 avl_node_t *node, *node2;
495 /* Send all known subnets and edges */
497 for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
498 n = (node_t *) node->data;
500 for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
501 s = (subnet_t *) node2->data;
502 send_add_subnet(c, s);
505 for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
506 e = (edge_t *) node2->data;
512 int ack_h(connection_t *c)
514 char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
515 char *hisaddress, *dummy;
523 (c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
524 syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name,
529 /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
531 n = lookup_node(c->name);
535 n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
539 /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
540 if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
541 syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"),
542 n->name, n->hostname);
543 terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
544 /* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
551 c->options |= options;
553 /* Activate this connection */
555 c->allow_request = ALL;
556 c->status.active = 1;
558 if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
559 syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name,
562 /* Send him everything we know */
566 /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
568 c->edge = new_edge();
570 c->edge->from = myself;
572 sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
573 c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
576 c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
577 c->edge->connection = c;
578 c->edge->options = c->options;
582 /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
584 send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
586 /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */